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COMMENTS
SECTION 11 OF THE SECURITIES ACT-
A PROPOSAL FOR ALLOCATING LIABILITY
The Securities Act of 19331 was enacted to implement a federal
policy of disclosure in the sale of securities.2 This policy is intended to
provide investors in the public securities market with sufficient infor-
mation for an intelligent investment decision.' The principal source of
this information is the registration statement 4 which must be filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission prior to the public
offering of some securities. The quality of disclosure provided in a
148 Stat. 74, as amended [hereinafter cited as 1933 Act], 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964).
248 Stat. 74 (1933) (preamble of Securities Act); SEC Securities Act Release No. 1,
May 27, 1933. For a concise review of the philosophy of the Securities Act, see 1 L. Loss,
Saicunas REGULATiON 121-28 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. See also Landis,
The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 29 (1959).3 E.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 US. 119, 119 n.3 (1953); SEC Security Act
Release 4552, Nov. 6, 1952; Weiss, Regulation A Under the Securities Act of 1933-High-
ways and Byways, 8 N.Y.L.F. 1, 11 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Weiss]; Note, 59 CoLurm.
L. RFv. 517 (1959).
It might be argued that much of the technical information presented in a registration
statement cannot be understood by many individual purchasers of securities. However,
in defense of the disclosure philosophy it can be pointed out that:
For most [early proponents of federal securities regulation] the objective was not
necessarily to protect the small investor from fraud, but a desire to assure a free
and open securities market ....
This concern over a free market was based on the theory that, given adequate
information, the laws of supply and demand, combined with action by each purchaser
for his own best interest, would establish a true market value for the security.
Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 M1cH. L. REV. 607, 614 (1964). Thus,
the disclosure required by the Securities Act may be particularly important as a condi-
tioner of the market:
The educational value of these opinions should aid in the development of the
intelligent investor. But the requirements of the Act are not based solely on the
belief that the investor will learn to protect himself. As in other fields, reliance is
placed upon the development of independent experts. The investment counsel, the
investment department of a bank and the financial advisory services obtain essen-
tial information concerning securities with a relatively broad market. [Prior to the
Act, this] information was . . . often undisclosed even to powerful institutional and
personal buyers. These experts, armed with sufficient information, serve to give the
investor new protection. Investment tends to become something less than gambling
and more of a process on which intelligence may be brought to bear.
MacChesney & O'Brien, Full Disclosure Under the Securities Act, 4 LAW & Co=TE3P.
PROB. 133, 153 (1937). See also Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv.
1340, 1352-53 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Cohen]; Note, 73 YA= L.J. 1477, 1483 nA6
(1964). In addition, see Mundheim, Foreword, Symposium on Securities Regulation, 29
LAW & CoxaMp. PRon. 647, 649-50 (1964), pointing out the growing importance of
institutional investors in the securities market.
"See notes 33 and 34 infra'and aceompanying text. See also note 3 supra.
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registration statement is subject to regulation by the Commission. As
a further inducement to the production of accurate information, section
115 of the Act allows purchasers of registered securities to recover
compensatory damages from the issuer, and certain others, who par-
ticipated in the preparation of a registration statement that contains
material error.
The section 11 civil remedy was recently the subject of judicial
attention in Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.6 The case is par-
ticularly noteworthy because it contains the first extensive judicial
discussion of the due diligence defense afforded non-issuer registration
participants.7 However, many of the defendants in BarChris had been
so careless in preparing the registration statement that the court's denial
of their motion to dismiss gives little indication of what due diligence
requires. 8 And the infrequency of section 11 cases in the past suggests
that judicial refinement of the due diligence standard may not be forth-
coming.9 Thus, registration participants must predict the content of
the due diligence standard at the risk of incurring a rather severe
liability. This uncertainty is likely to make the financial community
approach registration with an excess of caution that, while understand-
able, is not desirable.'"
Although this uncertainty is difficult to reduce, its undesirable effects
can at least be minimized. Section 11 gives each non-issuer participant
a right to recover contribution from the other participants subject to
liability." This comment will show how the right to contribution may
6 1933 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
8283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) [hereinafter cited as BarChris].
'See, e.g., Folk, Civil Liabilities under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case-
Part 1, 55 VA. L. Rav. 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Folk].
'See, e.g., Note, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1030, 1038 (1968); see also notes 114-118 infra and
accompanying text.
'Since enactment of the Securities Act, over 25,000 registration statements have been
filed with the SEC. Cohen, supra note 3, at 1359. By 1961, there had been only 11 re-
ported section 11 cases, of which two resulted in plaintiffs' recovery. 3 Loss, supra note
2, at 1690. BarChris is the only significant judicial discussion of what due diligence
requires of the participants in registration. See Folk, supra note 7.
"
0 See, e.g., an early report of the likely response of the financial community to the
BarChris decision in Kessler, Court Decision Prods Prospectus Prepares to Check Facts
Better, Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1968, at 1, col. 6. See also Wheat & Blackstone,
Guideposts for a First Public Offering, 15 Bus. LAW. 539 (1960), suggesting that an
increase in the cost and time involved in the registration process would be especially
burdensome for small corporations desiring to go public.
" 1933 Act § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. §77k(f) (1964). Discussion of the right to recover
contribution begins at text immediately following note 132 infra.
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be used to make the consequences of participating in registration more
predictable, by limiting a non-issuer participant's potential liability
to the consequences of his own carelessness. Part I will review briefly
the registration requirement, which determines the incidence of section
11 liability. Part I will then discuss the section 11 cause of action,
and demonstrate the importance and function of the right to recover
contribution. Finally, Part III will analyze -the right to contribution,
and consider how predictable results may be achieved through use of
a contribution agreement that does not amount to an unenforceable
indemnity agreement. 12 This discussion of the section 11 civil remedy
may also be of interest to those advocating an expansion of the section
11 cause of action to other areas of securities law?
I. REGISTRATION UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT
A. The Registration Requirement
A principal means of implementing the disclosure policy of the Se-
curities Act is the registration requirement, set forth in sections 3, 4,
and 5 of the Act. Section 5 requires14 the filing of a registration state-
ment for a security' 5 that will be offered for sale, sold, or delivered
after sale, 6 by any issuer, underwriter, dealer, or, in some cases,
controlling shareholder,17 through use of the mails or facilities of inter-
2- See note 141 infra and accompanying text.
"Dissatisfaction with the uncertainties of rule 10b-5, adopted by the Commission
pursuant to section 10b of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and a desire to
improve the quality of disclosure under the 1934 Act, have produced a revival of
interest in section 11 of the Securities Act as the basis for a comprehensive civil liability
provision. See, e.g., Comment, Auditors' Responsibility for Misrepresentation: Inade-
quate Protection for Users of Financial Statements, 44 WAsH. L. REv. 139, 186-191,
192-95 (1968).
" 1933 Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964). Failure to register when registration is re-
quired subjects the offender to criminal prosecution, Roe v. U.S., 287 F.2d 435 (5th
Cir. 1961); restraint by injunction, 1933 Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1964), SEC v.
Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); and liability to the purchaser, 1933
Act § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1964).
"A separate registration statement is required for each offering of a particular
security. See, e.g., Ira Haupt & Co., 23 SEC 589, 599-600 (1946); Cohen, supra note 3,
at 1359; Flanagin, The Federal Securities Act and the Locked-in Shareholder, 63 MxcH.
L. REv. 1139, 1142-63 (1965). For discussion of the effect of this limited coverage on
the section 11 civil remedy, see note 60 infra and accompanying text.
"For a discussion of the restrictions on offers and sales before the registration
statement is in effect, see notes 27-34 infra and accompanying text.
I"Section 4 of the 1933 Act provides that the registration requirement of section 5
applies only to transactions by an issuer, underwriter, or dealer. 1933 Act § 4, 15
U.S.C. § 77d (1964). The term "underwriter" includes a person who purchases from
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state commerce. Because courts have been willing to find use of the
jurisdictional means," and to give liberal interpretation to the broad
statutory definitions of "security",1 "sale",2" and "offer", 2' this for-
mulation of the registration requirement could reach many transac-
tions. 22 Consequently, many securities transactions for which registra-
tion would be unduly burdensome are exempted from the registration
an issuer, or from a person controlled by the issuer, with a view to distribution of
the security. 1933 Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b (11) (1964). See generally Note,
Regulation of Nonissuer Transactions Under Federal and State Securities Registration
Laws, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1635, 1635-43 (1965).
"
8 Federal jurisdiction is based on use of the mails or facilities of interstate com-
merce. 1933 Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964). The statute defines "interstate commerce"
to mean:
. . . trade or commerce in securities or any transportation or communication
relating thereto among the several States or between the District of Columbia
or any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between
any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or
within the District of Columbia.
1933 Act § 2(7), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(7) (1964). Judicial applications of the statutory
language are discussed in 1 Loss, supra note 2, at 207-11.
" 1933 Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964), defines the term "security." For a
general discussion, see 1 Loss, supra note 2, at 455-512. One type of security particularly
susceptible to broad judicial interpretation is the "investment contract." An invest-
ment contract will be found to exist if "the scheme involves an investment of money
in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." SEC v.
W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946); see also SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). The authorities are reviewed in Roe v. U.S., 287 F.2d
435 (5th Cir. 1961), holding that the offerings of mineral leases involved in the case
could be found to be investment contracts. A recent example which emphasizes the
importance of the investors' participation in the enterprise is Continental Marketing
Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967); the court concluded at 471 that "[t]he
economic inducement was the faith or hope in the success of the enterprise-the
domestic beaver industry-as a whole, and not the value of the animals alone."
'The statute defines the term "sale" to include "every contract of sale or disposition
of a security or interest in a security, for value." 1933 Act § 2(3), as amended, Act of
Aug. 10, 1954, ch. 667, § 1, 68 Stat. 683, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1964). For discussion of
the "no sale" rule and its present status, see 1 Loss, supra note 2, at 518-42 (1961 and
1969 Supp.).
'The term "offer" is defined to "include every attempt to offer or dispose of, or
solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value." 1933 Act
§ 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1964) (emphasis added). The exceptions from the
italicized portion of the definition are discussed briefly at note 30 infra.
The statutory definition is broader than the common law concept of offer, and
generally refers to any step in the process of attempting to dispose of a security. See
Weiss, supra note 3, at 87-104. The Commission has adopted a practical definition of
the term, which includes all communications constituting the commencement of a
sales campaign. Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., SEC Securities Act Release 5870, Feb. 9,
1959, CCH FED. SEc. L. RP. ff 76,635. In SEC v. Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), noted in 59 COLum. L. REv. 517 (1959), a prefiling press release
was held to be an offer for the sale of securities.
"One commentator pointed out that, if there were no exemptions from the registra-
tion requirement of section 5, "[t]he literal terms of the . . . Act [would] cut in
on the sale of a single piece of paper to a single purchaser." Victor & Bedrick, Private6
Offering: Hazards for the Unwary, 45 VA. L. Rxv. 869, 870 (1959).
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requirement23 by sections 3 and 4 of the Act.24 Because the exemptions
are very technical and narrowly construed,25 the statutory provisions
and regulatory material must be examined closely to determine
whether an exemption is available for a particular case. It is sufficient
here to point out that the registration requirement generally applies
to public offerings of investment securities. 26
B. The Registration Statement
If registration is required for a particular offering, the securities
cannot lawfully be offered for sale, sold, or delivered after sale, until
a registration statement is filed with the Commission. Prior to filing,
I Sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act exempt certain securities transactions from the
registration requirement of section 5, and thus from civil liability under section 11.
See 1933 Act §§ 3-5, 11, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77e, 77k (1964). Sections 3 and 4 do not
exempt these securities transactions from the anti-fraud provisions of section 17,
1933 Act § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964), or, in most cases, from the civil remedies of
section 12(2), 1933 Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
'Section 3 exempts from registration short-term notes, trustees' certificates, certain
insurance policies and annuity contracts, and securities issued subject to ICC approval;
also exempted are securities issued by specified governmental authorities or financial
institutions, by qualifying non-profit organizations or by certain small business investment
companies, and securities guaranteed by specified governmental authorities or banking
institutions. 1933 Act §§ 3(a)(2)-3(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(2)-77c(a)(8) (1964). SEC
rules may also exempt from registration securities issued by small business investment
companies, if the Commission "finds . . . that the enforcement of [the Securities Act]
with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public interest and for the pro-
tection of investors?' 1933 Act § 3(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(c) (1964). For discussion of
the exempted securities, see generally 1 Loss, supra note 2, at 496-501, 560-72, 639-41.
Sections 3 and 4 also exempt from registration intrastate offerings, limited issues,
certain exchanges of securities, non-public offerings by issuers, and some transactions
by brokers and dealers. 1933 Act §§ 3(a) (9)-3(a) (11), 3(b), 4(2)-4(4), 1 U.S.C.
§§ 77(a)(9)-77c(a)(11), 77c(b), 77d(2)-77d(4) (1964). For discussions of the
exempted transactions, see generally 1 Loss, supra note 2, at 256-59, 573-639, 653-708.
The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, as amended, also exempts from registration under
the 1933 Securities Act certain securities issued under a mortgage or trust deed inden-
ture as to which a contract of insurance under the National Housing Act is in effect.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77ddd(a)(5), (a)(10). See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(f), 664 (1964), for
additional exemptions provided for by the federal Bankruptcy Act.
2-17 C.F.R. § 230.252(a) (1968). In addition, the burden of proving that an exemp-
tion applies to a particular case is on the party claiming the exemption. SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
'See Lobell, Revision of the Securities Act, 48 CoLum. L. Rxv. 313, 317 (1948).
For further discussion of the exemptions from registration see generally Cohen,
Federal Legislation Affecting the Public Offering of Securities, 28 Gxo. WAsH. L. Rv.
119, 140-49 (1959); Throop & Lane, Some Problems of Exemption Under the Securities
Act of 1933, 4 LAW & CONTENT. PROB. 89 (1937).
'1933 Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964). Section 2(3) provides an exception to this
prohibition for "preliminary negotiations or agreements" between the issuer and under-
writer "or among underwriters who are or are to be in privity of contract with an
issuer." 1933 Act § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1964).
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dealers are also prohibited from making offers to buy.2 8 After filing,
there is a waiting period of twenty days or less29 during which sales
are prohibited though some kinds of offers are allowed."0 At the end
of the waiting period, the registration statement becomes effective."'
Thereafter, the security can be sold and delivered, and offers accom-
panied by supplemental literature can be made. 2 These limitations on
trading prior to the effectiveness of a registration statement make the
registration statement a principal source of information about the
particular offering."3 In addition, a substantial portion of the informa-
' 1933 Act § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1964). The statutory prohibition does not
apply to offers made by underwriters. See note 27 supra. Professor Loss concludes that
the prohibition does not apply to offers made by investors, basing his conclusion' on
the legislative history of the Securities Act. 1 Loss, supra note 2, at 213.
2 1933 Act § 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1964). The Commission is granted authority
to accelerate the effective date under certain circumstances.
' 1933 Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1964) (sales prohibited); 1933 Act § 5(b)(1),
15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1) (1964) (some offers allowed). Professor Loss lists five devices
which can be used to offer or advertise securities during the waiting period:
(1) oral communication
(2) tombstone ad
(3) preliminary prospectus
(4) Rule 434 summary prospectus
(5) Rule 434a summary prospectus, filed with the SEC as part of the registration
statement.
1 Loss, supra note 2, at 243.
u By definition, the registration statement becomes effective at the end of the waiting
period. See note 29 supra. This assumes that the Commission does not exercise its
power, discussed at notes 52-55 infra and accompanying text, to issue a stop order or
to suspend the effectiveness of the registration statement.
'See 1933 Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1964). After the registration statement
becomes effective, the prospectus requirement of section 5(b) must be complied with.
1933 Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1964). Section 10, to which section 5(b) refers,
does not allow use of a preliminary prospectus, or of a Rule 434 summary prospectus,
after the effective date of the registration statement. However, oral offers would still
be allowed because the definition of "prospectus" is limited to writings. 1933 Act
§ 2(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1964). Supplemental literature accompanying or follow-
ing the prospectus may also be allowed. Id. But "extreme caution [should] be taken
. . . to insure that any written material which may fail within the definition of a
prospectus . . . should not be used unless and until such material is accompanied or
preceded by a statutory prospectus . . . ." SEC v. Georgia Pacific Corp., Litig. Rel. 1055
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) at 2. Professor Loss adds a caveat that such literature must be "part
of the same selling campaign initiated by the full prospectus . . . [and not] a new
attempt to sell . . . ." 1 Loss, supra note 2, at 250.
' "The information contained in or filed with any registration statement shall be
made available to the public . . . ." 1933 Act § 6(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(d) (1964). The
legislative policy of protecting investors through adequate disclosure in the registra-
tion statement of course assumes that investors will base their investment decisions,
directly or indirectly, on the information provided in the registration statement, rather
than on market "tips" or unsubstantiated rumor. See Comment, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv.
541, 550-51 (1968). In enacting the Securities Act, "Congress did not take away
from the citizen 'his inalienable right to make a fool of himself.' It simply attempted
to prevent others from making a fool of him." 1 Loss, supra note 2, at 128. However,
use of the information disclosed under the Securities Act by highly sophisticated,
institutional investors is important as a conditioner of the market. See note 3 supra.
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tion contained in the registration statement is furnished directly to
prospective investors in the prospectus.34
The contents of most registration statements are prescribed by
section 7 11 and schedule A"8 of the 1933 Act.17 In general, the text of
the registration statement describes the issuer and its capitalization,
identifies the underwriter of the issue and the directors and principal
officers of the issuer, stating the respective interests of these persons in
the issuer, and provides certain other information about the security
issue. Detailed financial information is presented in current balance
sheets 38 and profit and loss statements.39 The statutory requirements
can be supplemented or modified by the Commission.40 As a result of
the emphasis on accurate disclosure, the specific items required to be
disclosed in the registration statement may vary from case to case.41
The heart of a registration statement is contained in the financial
- 1933 Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1964). Thus, it is common practice to refer to
the "prospectus part" of the registration statement.
1933 Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1964).
1933 Act Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1964).
The contents of a registration Statement relating to securities issued by a foreign
government are prescribed by schedule B of the 1933 Act. 1933 Act § 7, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77g (1964).
'The balance sheet must have been prepared no more than ninety days prior to
the date the registration statement is filed; if this balance sheet is not certified, a
certified balance sheet prepared within one year of the filing date must also be included.
1933 Act Schedule A(25), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25) (1964).
P A profit and loss statement must be submitted for the most recent fiscal year
for which one is available; if that fiscal year ended more than six months before the
registration statement is filed, a more recent profit and loss statement must be pre-
pared. 1933 Act Schedule A(26), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1964). In addition, profit and loss
statements for each of the two preceeding fiscal years must also be submitted, unless
the issuer has been in business for a shorter period of time. Id. See generally Weiss,
supra note 3, at 104-09.
... the Commission may by rules or regulations provide that any .. . informa-
tion or document [specified in Schedule A] need not be included in respect of
any class of issuers or securities if it finds that the requirement of such informa-
tion or document is inapplicable to such class and that disclosure fully adequate
for the protection of investors is otherwise required to be included within the
registration statement . . .. Any such registration statement shall contain such
other information, and be accompanied by such other documents, as the Com-
mission may . .. require as being necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.
1933 Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1964). For an excellent discussion of what information
is important to investors, see Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities
Regulation, 16 Bus. LAw. 300 (1961).
'Form S-1 is the general form used for registration statements; several other forms
are prescribed for special cases. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.400-.494 (1968) (Regulation C);
51 HAnV. L. REv. 1354 (1938). For discussion of the contents of a registration
statement, see Duff, The First Public Financing of a Closely-Held Corporation:
Securities Act of 1933 Aspects, 34 U.M.K.C.L. Rav. 242 (1966); Wheat & Blackstone,
supra note 10.
101
Washington Law Review Vol. 45: 95, 1970
statements.42 They must be certified by an independent 3 public or
certified accountant.44 Therefore, the statements contain the auditor's
opinion that they "present fairly the financial position and results of
operations [of the issuing entity] in accordance with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles."45 This statement is regarded for section
11 purposes as a statement of fact,48 as are the representations of other
experts.4T Thus, neither the certifying accountant nor any other expert
can avoid section 11 liability by claiming that his report is merely an
expression of opinion rather than a statement of fact.
4
C. Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Before proceeding to a discussion of the section 11 civil remedy, it
is important to note the function of the SEC in maintaining the quality
of disclosure under the Securities Act. During the waiting period,
which begins immediately after the registration statement is filed,49
the Commission staff carefully examines the registration statement
to determine whether it provides adequate disclosure.5° Commission
2 Wheat & Blackstone, supra note 10, at 555. The particular items that must be
included in the financial statements are specified by rules of the Commission, pro-
mulgated under authority granted in 1933 Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1964). In
addition, the statute sets forth some basic requirements. 1933 Act § Schedule A(25)-
(26), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25)-(26) (1964). Regulation S-X, adopted by the Commission,
specifies the manner in which these items must be presented. SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R.§ 210 (1968). For further discussion, see generally Comment, supra note 13.
' SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02 (1968) requires the certifying accountant to
be independent of the issuer. For example, the principal bookkeeper of the issuer will
not qualify as an "independent public or certified accountant." SEC v. North American
Finance Co., 214 F. Supp. 197 (D.C. Ariz. 1959). SEC decisions under the rule are
summarized in SEC Accounting Series Release No. 81 (Dec. 11, 1958).
"1933 Act Schedule A(25)-(26), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25)-(26) (1964).
'SThis is a standard statement of the auditor's opinion, on which readers of the
financial statements place heavy reliance. See Comment, supra note 13, at 141. As the
authors of the Comment point out, id. at 182-86, this statement contains two representa-
tions: (1) that the financial information is presented fairly, and (2) that the informa-
tion is presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
" The statement represents the basis on which the auditor's opinion is expressed.
See MacChesney & O'Brien, Full Disclosure Under the Securities Act, 4 LAW & CONTLIMP.
PROB. 133, 143-45 (1937).
"
7 See, e.g., Cornucopia Gold Mines, 1 SEC 364 (1936).
" Liability would be the expected result. See Comment, supra note 13, at 188;
notes 46 and 47 supra. This also represents the position of the Commission in stop
order cases. E.g., Gilpin Eureka Consolidated Mines, Inc., I SEC 752 (1936); Big
Wedge Gold Mining Co., 1 SEC 98, 107 (1935).
"See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
5"See 1 Loss, supra note 2, at 272-77; Cohen, Federal Legislation Affecting the
Public Offering of Securities, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 119, 152-54 (1959); Jackson,
Public Offerings: A Comparative Study of Disclosure in Western Europe and the
United States, 16 WEST. RES. L. REv. 44, 97-105 (1964). The SEC's careful scrutiny
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objections, which are usually noted in a deficiency letter, may be
removed by filing appropriate amendments to the registration state-
ment.5 ' However, the Commission also has broad powers to institute
formal proceedings. If the registration statement appears on its face to
be "incomplete or inaccurate in any material respect", the Commis-
sion may issue an order, prior to the effective date, refusing to allow
the registration statement to become effective until it has been amended
in a manner satisfactory to the Commission. 3 In addition, the Com-
mission has power to "issue a stop order suspending the effectiveness
of the registration statement" if the statement appears to contain
material error.as This power may be exercised at any time, whether
before or after the registration statement becomes effective, and has
the effect of halting further lawful distribution of the securities.5
When the Commission is satisfied that disclosure is adequate, the
registration statement is allowed to become, and remain, effective.
Although the statute is clear that Commission approval of a registra-
tion statement is not to be construed as an endorsement of either the
soundness of the particular security as an investment or the accuracy
of the registration statement,5 6 the scarcity of actions for damages
under section 11 has been attributed largely to the effectiveness of
the Commission's exercise of its regulatory powers.T
of registration statements represents a departure from the English Companies' Act,
which served as a model for many of the Securities Act provisions. Landis, supra
note 2, at 34-35; Knauss, supra note 3, at 616.
r 1 Loss, supra note 2, at 272-73.
'1933 Act § 8(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b) (1964).
3 Id.
" 1933 Act § 8(d), 15 US.C. § 77h(d) (1964).
'ISee 1933 Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964), discussed at notes 27-34 supra and
accompanying text. See also Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. SEC, 100 F.2d 888 (10th Cir.
1939).
The SEC also has authority to refuse to allow a registrant to withdraw its
registration statement before a stop order is entered. See, e.g., Columbia General
Investment Corp. v. SEC, 265 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1959).
I The "sole function [of the SEC] is to assure that the registration statement is
accurate and complete." 1 Loss, supra note 2 at 130. Indeed, representations to the
contrary are unlawful. 1933 Act § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 77w (1964). See also H.R. Rep.
No. 85, 73d. Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1933).
1'E.g., 3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1690-91; Weiss, supra note 3, at 24-25; Cohen,
supra note 3, at 1353-54. The Commission relies heavily on its investigation of
registration filings. See Note, Commingled Civil and Criminal Proceedings: A Peek at
Constitutional Limitations and a Poke at the SEC, 34 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 527,
528-29 (1966). See also Rodell, Regulation of Securities by the Federal Trade Com-
mission, 43 YALE, L.J. 272 (1933), for a discussion of the importance of SEC regulation
from a preventive standpoint; Johnson & Jackson, The Securities and Exchange
Commission: Its Organization and Functions Under the Securities Act of 1933, 4 Law
& Cowrap. PROB. 3, 3-5 (1937).
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II. CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 11
A. In General
Section 11 of the Securities Act5" affords a civil remedy to pur-
chasers 9 of securities that are covered by an effective registration
statement. 60 An action under section 11 is available if any part of the
registration statement, when it became effective, 6' contained "an untrue
statement of material fact or [an omission] to state a material fact
required to be stated [in the registration statement] or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading."6 This operative element
of the section 11 cause of action can be referred to summarily as
"cmaterial error."
The basic elements of a section 11 cause of action are designed to
relieve purchasers of securities from the difficulties of a common law
action for deceit.63 Perhaps most important is the absence of a privity
requirement.64 A purchaser of securities may recover damages65 from
certain designated individuals or entities that participated in preparing
the registration statement, even if the defendants did not actually
participate in sale of the securities.66 Elimination of a privity require-
ment recognizes that, because the registration statement is the ultimate
"1933 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
SId., subsection (a); the statute affords the remedy to "any person acquiring" the
security. This language is interpreted to afford the remedy to purchasers of the security.
Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See generally 1967 DuKE L.J. 214.
For a discussion of class actions under section 11, see Green, Civil Liability to
Stockholders Under the Securities Act of 1933 and Remedy by Class Action, 2 SAN,
DiEco L. REV. 34, 41-53 (1965).
'The remedy is not available for securities of the same issuer, or even securities
of the same class, which are not covered by the registration statement. Barnes v. Osofsky,
373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 257 F. Supp.
875 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 1967 DuKE L.'. 214; 65 MicH. L. REV. 795 (1967). See also
Rudnick v. Franchard, 237 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"The registration statement becomes effective at the end of the waiting period
unless acceleration has been granted. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text.
Amendments filed after the effective date of the registration statement become effective
"on such date as the Commission may determine." 1933 Act § 8(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(c)
(1964).
"1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77 k(a) (1964).
"See generally 3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1638; Douglas & Bates, The Federal Se-
curities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 174 (1933); Shulman, Civil Liability and the
Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 233-42 (1933).
"Shulman, supra note 63, at 249.
'Section 11, as the result of a 1934 amendment, no longer provides for rescission;
relief under that section is limited to recovery of damages. Simpson, Investors' Civil
Remedies Under the Federal Securities Law, 12 Dz PAuL L. Rv. 71, 75 (1962).
"E.g., BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 642. For discussion of the persons subject to
liability under section 11, see generally Douglas & Bates, supra note 63, at 190-210.
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source of reference for information about a particular offering,67 a
material error in the registration statement may, through its effect on
the market price of the security, indirectly cause damage to the
purchaser just as efficiently as though he had relied to his detriment on
a direct misrepresentation by his immediate vendor.68 Nor is recovery
dependent on proof that the defendant's material error was made
intentionally, or even knowingly. 9 This frees plaintiffs from the diffi-
culty of having to establish an exacting scienter element, which was
required at common law to protect businessmen from the odium of a
judgment of deceit.70
The common law elements of reliance and causation, however, have
not been completely abandoned by section 11. The requirement of
materiality retains both elements to some extent.71 Moreover, a plain-
tiff is required to prove his reliance, as a separate element of his cause
of action, if he "acquired the security after the issuer has made
generally available to its security holders an earnings statement cover-
ing a period of at least twelve months beginning after the effective
date of the registration statement .... " This requirement was added
in 1934 on the assumption that purchasers of securities are less likely
to rely on the registration statement when a subsequent current earn-
ings statement becomes available.73 But even if reliance must be
proved, plaintiff need not establish that he actually read the registra-
tion statement. 74 In all cases, however, the defendant will prevail if
he proves that the plaintiff, when he acquired the security, was aware
of the actionable misstatement or omission and knew that it was
erroneous.
75
e' See notes 33 & 34 supra and accompanying text.
'See Shulman, supra note 63, at 229-30, 239. In addition, the financial community's
discovery of a material error in the registration statement can be expected to have
an effect on the security's market value. See note 3 supra.
'However, under section 11 each defendant, except the issuer, is exonerated from
liability if he can prove his exercise of due diligence with respect to preparation of
the registration statement. 1933 Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1964). The due
diligence defense is discussed at notes 102-18 infra and accompanying text.
"'See Shulman, supra note 63, at 233-34.
'See generally Shulman, supra note 63, at 249-51; notes 91-101 infra and ac-
companying text.
U1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964).
H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934).
"'1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964). See generally Rudnick v. Franchard,
237 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964); see Martin v. Hull, 92 F.2d 208
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 726 (1937).
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Proof of causation is treated differently. Section 11 does not require
plaintiff to prove causation directly, because of the recognized difficulty
of establishing a causal relationship between a decline in the price of
a security and a particular material error in the registration state-
ment.76 However, causation is retained as an affirmative defense by
which a defendant can reduce the amount of his liability to the extent
that he can prove that plaintiff's loss was caused by something unre-
lated to the particular defendant's conduct.7 7 The difficulty of imagin-
ing a case in which this burden could be met78 has consequences for
registration participants which will be discussed later.79
The measure of damages prescribed by section 11 is essentially
compensatory. 0 If plaintiff prevails, he can recover the difference
between (1) the lower of the amount he paid for the security or the
price at which the security was offered to the public, and (2) the
lower of the value of the security at the time of suit or the price at
which the security was disposed of by the plaintiff in the market.8 '
This rule may discourage a plaintiff from continuing to hold his secu-
rities after suit is filed.8 2 Therefore, in most cases the damages re-
6 Shulman, supra note 63, at 250-57; see Knauss, supra note 3, at 627; see also
3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1728.
.r .. if the defendant proves that any portion or all of [the damages calculated
by means of the formula at note 81 infra and accompanying text] represents
other than the depreciation in value of such security resulting from such part
of the registration statement, with respect to which his liability is asserted, not
being true or omitting to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, such portion of or all
such damages shall not be recoverable.
1933 Act § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964). Thus, the difficult burden of tracing the
market effects of particular errors in the registration statement is placed on each
defendant. See note 78 infra.
'This [establishing the causation defense] would appear to be virtually an impos-
sible burden for the defendant to carry. If the market generally declines following
a registered issue in connection with which there are false or misleading statements,
it is reasonable to suppose that some part of the decline in price of this particular
security was due to general market conditions. But how can one prove exactly
what part? Perhaps if there were a market decline before discovery of the false
statement, the drop in price before such discovery might be sufficiently shown to
be due to other causes; but even this appears doubtful.
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALs 567 (1963).
The court in BarChris did not pass on the causation issue, 283 F. Supp. at 703-04,
although it was raised in the defendants' pleadings. BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 652, 703.
See generally, 3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1721-1742.
' Notes 119-32 iira and accompanying text.
'"See, e.g., Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
' 1933 Act § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964).
"
2 See 3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1728.
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covered will be the difference between what plaintiff paid for the
security and its market value at the time of suit."3
There are, however, some limitations on the damages recoverable.
Of general importance is the specific provision that the plaintiff's
recovery, and hence the liability of the defendants, cannot exceed the
price at which the security was offered to the public.84 Further, a spe-
cial rule limits the liability of most underwriters 5 to "the total price at
which the securities underwritten by [the underwriter] and distributed
to the public were offered to the public."8 6 With the limited but im-
portant exception provided by this special rule, all defendants are
made jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the plaintiff's
recovery. 7
Finally, to reduce the potential severity of section 11 liability,8
Congress in 1934 shortened the time within which an action must be
brought. Plaintiff must bring his action within one year after he dis-
covered, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the material error. 89 And in no event may an action be
brought more than three years after the securities were bona fide of-
fered to the public.9
B. Materiality
The preceding section reviewed the basic elements of a section 1i
cause of action. Further attention is here directed to the requirement
'This rule limits a purchaser's recovery to his out-of-pocket loss. See, e.g., Comment,
supra note 13, at 189-91. The authors of that Comment suggest that a purchaser of
securities, at least in some cases, should be allowed to recover damages for the value
his securities would have had if the information presented in the registration statement
had been accurate
" 1933 Act § 11(g), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(g) (1964).
'An underwriter does not qualify for this special limitation if he:
...knowingly received from the issuer for acting as an underwriter some benefit,
directly or indirectly, in which all 'ther underwriters similarly situated did not
share in proportion to their respective interests in the underwriting .
1933 Act § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964).
88 Id.
' 1933 Act § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1964).
'43 Loss, supra note 2, at 1743; see Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities
Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WAsiH. L. REv. 29, 40 n.18 (1959).
'0 1933 Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964). As Professor Loss points out, under a
literal reading of section 13 it is possible for the statute of limitations to expire
before a purchaser seeking damages under section 11 acquires the security. 3 Loss,
supra note 2, at 1743. Whether a court would read section 13 literally to reach such
a result seems open to question.
' 1933 Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964). For discussion of the possibility of
raising estoppel, waiver, or laches as a defense, see 73 YALE L.J. 1477 (1964).
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that a plaintiff establish the materiality of the misstatement or mis-
leading omission on which he bases his claim for relief.9" This require-
ment has the effect of limiting the defendants' liability for errors in
the registration statement to "[facts] which if ... correctly stated or
disclosed would have deterred or tended to deter the average prudent
investor from purchasing the securities in question."92 Thus, in deter-
mining whether a particular error is material, the court will examine
the anticipated effects of the error on a hypothetical average prudent
investor. Materiality is evaluated as of the effective date of the part
of the registration statement in which the alleged error occurs, regard-
less of when plaintiff acquired the security. 3
In Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,94 the court considered
the materiality of three errors which presented the court with close
questions."3 In that case, purchasers of convertible debentures chal-
lenged the accuracy of items presented in the registration statement, 6
which became effective on May 16, 1961. Operating income for 1960,
shown in the registration statement to be $1,742,801, was in fact only
$1,496,196. The effect of this error was to increase the earnings per
share from 65 cents, the value without the error, to 75 cents. However,
the court examined all the circumstances and held that the error was
not material. The court observed that the debentures had been rated
"speculative" by the investment services. In addition, the 1959 earn-
ings per share had been only 35 cents. Therefore, because the earnings
per share of this speculative security admittedly had doubled from
1959 to 1960, the court decided that "the effect" of the overstatement
of operating income was "comparatively minor."9 A second error was
0'1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964), quoted in text accompanying
note 62 supra.02 BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 681, quoting from Matter of Charles A. Howard, 1 SEC 6,
8 (1934). See also SEC Securities Act Rule 405(l), C.F.R. § 230.405(l) (1968).
' 1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964). Thus, if a material error occurs in
an amendment to the registration statement, materiality as of the date that amend-
ment became effective is controlling. See generally 3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1729.
"283 F. Supp. 643 (SM.DN.Y. 1968).
°'These examples are taken from errors in the 1960 BarChris financial statements.
In contrast, the court apparently believed that the errors which related to the 1961
state of affairs were clearly material. See BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 681.
' The court's reference to errors in the "prospectus" refers to errors in the prospectus
part of the registration statement, on which plaintiffs of necessity based their section 11
cause of action. See BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 655; see also note 34 supra and ac-
companying text.
c
7BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 682.
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the understatement of contingent liabilities by $375,000 in a footnote
to the consolidated balance sheet. But, even without this understate-
ment, the balance sheet showed contingent liabilities of $4,719,835,
while the company had total assets of only $6,101,085. As the court
observed, "[i]f [purchasers] were willing to buy the debentures in
the face of this information, as they obviously were, [it is doubtful]
that they would have been deterred if they had been told that the
contingent liabilities were actually $375,000 higher."9 s Thus, the
plaintiff's buying habits apparently may be attributed to the hypo-
thetical average prudent investor. These two examples can be con-
trasted with a third error, which the court found to be material.
Current assets were overstated, and current liabilities were under-
stated, in amounts sufficient to produce a current assets to current
liabilities ratio of 1.9 to 1.0. Without the error, the ratio would have
been 1.6 to 1.0. The court, on the premise that the average prudent
investor would barely be willing to invest in securities with a current
ratio of 1.9 to 1.0, apparently found that knowledge of the actual
ratio "would have deterred or tended to deter the average prudent
investor from purchasing" the BarChris debentures. 9
These examples reveal the basic assumption underlying the section
11 cause of action. The assumption is that only material errors-as
defined above-will affect the market value of a registered security.
Thus, by definition, a material error is one having certain effects which
produce the damages allowed by section 11 to a purchaser of the
security.' Analytically, therefore, the materiality requirement sup-
plies a causal nexus between a registration statement error on the one
hand, and a purchaser's damages on the other. Significantly, this
GsId.
"Id. at 681.
'A purchaser's damages are measured by a decline in the market value of his
securities. See notes 80-83 supra and accompanying text. Such a decline is attributable
to a reduction in market demand for' the securities, which is assumed to result from
the effects, on the buying habits of "average prudent investors", of material errors in the
registration statement. See note 147 infra.
An additional assumption, which is probably not unrealistic, is implicit in the
Securities Act. In attempting to secure for investors information that is free from
material error, the Securities Act assumes that the investors will seek out the facts
about a particular offering, and will not rely on rumors. See 43 N.Y.U.L. Rlv.
541, 550-51 (1968); see also Shulman, supra note 63, at 249-50. Although this
assumption may not be true of many small investors, it is probably true of the highly
sophisticated, institutional investors which generally have substantial effects on the
market for a security. See note 3 supra.
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nexus is unlike the causation defense, because it does not have to be
explicitly proved by a purchaser who seeks recovery. 1"
C. Reducing Liability
Having reviewed the elements of a plaintiff's cause of action under
section 11, it is appropriate to consider how a non-issuer defendant
can avoid, or at least reduce, his liability. The following discussion
will consider the due diligence defense and its effects on liability, and
will then analyze the non-issuer defendants' rights to recover contribu-
tion from each other.
1. Due Diligence
In a section 11 action, every defendant except the issuer 1 2 is af-
forded an affirmative defense of due diligence.'0 3 The requirements
for establishing this defense vary, depending upon which part of the
registration statement contains the material error on which the pur-
chaser bases his claim for relief. If the material error occurs in a part
of the registration statement which does not purport to have been
made on the authority of an expert or public official, the defendant
must prove that "he had, after reasonable investigation,", reasonable
ground to believe"°" and did believe" that the particular part of the
registration statement was free from material error. 6 The same
burden is placed on an expert defendant, with respect to any part of
the registration statement "purporting to be made upon his authority
'
1 See note 78 supra, for a discussion of the difficult burden of proof required to
establish the causation defense. The practical result of this burden is that the right
to contribution, rather than the causation defense, must be used to allocate liability
proportionately among the registration participants held jointly and severally liable
under section 11. See notes 122-35 infra and accompanying text. Such an allocation
through use of the right to contribution is made possible by the causal nexus implicit
in the materiality test. See notes 146-47 infra and accompanying text.
' 1933 Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1964). Thus, the issuer is essentially made
an insurer of the accuracy of the registration statement.
1031933 Act § 11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (1964).
'" The first element of the duty to exercise due diligence requires the non-issuer
participants to investigate the accuracy of the information contained in the registration
statement. The specific requirements of this duty vary from participant to participant.
See note 185 infra and accompanying text.
"° The second element of the due diligence standard is the reasonableness of the
participant's belief that the part of the registration statement for which he is re-
sponsible is accurate. The reasonableness of belief is "that required of a prudent man
in the management of his own property." 1933 Act § 11(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1964).0 1933 Act § 11(b) (3) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (A) (1964).
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as an expert."107 The other formulation of the due diligence standard
applies to parts of the registration statement made upon the authority
of an expert other than the particular defendant. In such cases, the
defendant need only establish that "he had no reasonable ground to
believe 0 8 and did not believe" that the particular part of the registra-
tion statement contained a material error.109 Thus, for parts of the
registration statement purporting to be made upon the authority of
an expert, defendants other than the expert have no duty to investi-
gate the accuracy of those parts." 0 This provides an incentive for
registrants to attempt to "expertise" as much of the registration
statement as possible, in order to lower the duty of care they are
required to fulfill. In most cases, however, both the SEC and the
courts have been successful in resisting these attempts.:"
Essentially, therefore, section 11 creates a standard of reasonable
care for all registration *participants except the issuer, which remains
subject to liability irrespective of fault on its part."' The rationale
for placing the burden on a non-issuer defendant to prove his due
diligence is that he is in a better position than the plaintiff to know
the circumstances attending preparation of the registration state-
ment."
n3
The statute attempts to make the due diligence standard more
specific by providing that the reasonableness of a non-issuer's inves-
tigation is judged from the standpoint of "a prudent man in the man-
agement of his own property."" 4 Unfortunately, neither the statute
nor existing judicial authority is much more specific. BarChris is the
first extended judicial discussion of the requirements of the due
diligence standard.'" But because the case arose on motion to dismiss
"' 1933 Act § 11(b) (3) (B), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (B) (1964).
's See note 105 supra.
"' 1933 Act § 11(b) (3) (C), 15 U.S.C. §77k(b) (3) (C) (1964).
" However, to satisfy the "no reason to believe" test, such defendants have a duty
to inquire further into suspicious facts that are within their knowledge. See, e.g.,
BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 684-85.
n'For example, the court in BarChris rejected the dain of some defendants that
the entire registration statement was expertised because it had been prepared by
attorneys. BarChrs, 283 F. Supp. at 683.2 See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
n'Teass, Duty of Directors and Others as Prescribed by Section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933, 20 VA. L. Rnv. 817, 826, 844 (1934).
11 1933 Act § 11(c), 15 U.S.C. 77k(c) (1964).
ur5 See Folk, supra note 7, at 4-5.
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and involved rather extreme conduct," 6 it is not very helpful in pre-
dicting what conduct will satisfy the due diligence requirement. Since
the decision, many commentators have attempted to give more spe-
cific content to the due diligence standard, and their efforts will not
be repeated here." 7 In any event, because few section 11 cases have
been reported to date," 8 it seems unlikely that due diligence will
receive further judicial refinement in the immediate future.
2. Operation of the Main Cause of Action
As suggested in the preceding paragraphs, a plaintiff who seeks
recovery under section 11 must first identify one or more errors in
the registration statement." 9 Next, each identified error is examined
to determine whether it is material. For the purpose of analysis, each
error found to be material is then associated with the part' of the
registration statement in which it occurs. Assuming that plaintiff has
established the other elements of his cause of action, each defendant
has the burden of proving that he exercised due diligence with respect
to the parts of the registration statement which contain material
error.
1 2 1
A defendant who proves that he exercised due diligence with re-
spect to the whole registration statement will escape section 11 liabil-
ity. But a defendant who can prove his due diligence only with respect
to some of the erroneous parts of the registration statement, so that
he is responsible for one or more material errors, may be held jointly
and severally liable for all of the plaintiff's loss. 22 Absent the avail-
" For example, the court said that the chief executive officer of BarChris arranged
a transaction which "border[ed] on the fraudulent", and that the auditors conducted
an S-1 review that was "useless." BarChris, 238 F. Supp. at 684, 702.
'See, e.g., Folk, supra note 7; Proceedings, ABA National Institute, The BarChris
Case: Prospectus Liability, 24 Bus. LAW. 523 (Jan. 1969); 68 CoLum. L. Ray. 1411
(1968); 44 Noa-R DAmE LAw 122 (1968); 43 N.Y.U.L. RFv. 1030 (1968); 21 STAN.
L. Rav. 171 (1968); 16 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 177 (1968).
11 See note 9 supra.
"Plainiff need only prove the existence of one material error to recover damages
under section 11. See 1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964). However, plaintiff
may allege several material errors to strengthen his case, and may prove several
material errors in order to obtain a joint and several judgment against several defendants.
See, e.g., BarChris, 283 F. Supp. 643.
' "Part" is not a technical word; it merely refers to the physical location, in the
registration statement, of a particular error. See 1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)
(1964).
'A good example of the organization of a section 11 analysis is the BarChris case.
BarChris, 283 F. Supp. 643.
"'-See 1933 Act §§ 11(a), (b), (e), (f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), (b), (e), (f) (1964); see
also The Law: Trouble For the Top, FORBES, Sept. 1, 1968, at 29.
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ability of other defenses, 23 a defendant can escape this joint and
several liability only if he "proves that any portion or all of [plain-
tiff's] damages represents other than the depreciation in value of
[plaintiff's] security resulting from" a material error, or errors, for
which defendant is responsible12- But how could a defendant estab-
lish this defense? Consider a case in which three parts of the registra-
tion statement are the subject of inquiry, each part containing a
material error. Suppose D, one of the defendants, can establish his
exercise of due diligence with respect to two parts but not with respect
to the third. A literal application of the statute, before the causation
defense is considered, would make D jointly and severally liable for
the full amount of plaintiff's loss.2 5 The causation defense provides
D with two possibilities. First, if D can overcome the difficult bur-
den 128 of proving that a portion of plaintiff's damages was caused by
market conditions unrelated to material errors in the registration
statement, he can diminish the amount of his liability pro tanto. How-
ever, this will not change D's position in relation to the other defen-
dants with whom he is jointly and severally liable; D will remain
jointly and severally liable, but for a smaller total amount.12 7 Second,
D may admit that some portion of plaintiff's loss did result from the
effects of material errors in the registration statement, but prove that
a certain part of that portion was caused by material errors for which
D was not responsible. In the hypothetical being discussed, D would
have to establish that a certain amount of plaintiff's loss was caused
I These "other defenses" would include: proof that the plaintiff had knowledge of
the material error or errors when he acquired the security, 1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(a) (1964) ; the bar of the statute of limitations, or laches, discussed at notes 89-90
supra and accompanying text; for defendants except the issuer, the due diligence defense,
discussed at notes 102-14 supra and accompanying text; the special limitation on the
liability of underwriters, discussed at notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text; and,
failure of the plaintiff to prove the elements of his cause of action. In addition, a non-
issuer will escape liability if he proves that: (1) he had resigned, or taken steps to
resign, from his relationship with the issuer prior to the effective date, .in accordance
with statutory requirements, and had notified the SEC and the issuer that he would
not be responsible for the registration statement; or (2) the registration statement be-
came effective without his knowledge, and he gave appropriate notice to the SEC and to
the public. 1933 Act § 11(b) (1) and (2), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1) and (2) (1964).
' 1933 Act § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964).
'- See note 122 supra.
'a See note 78 supra.
'The same result will follow even if one of the other defendants proved that part of
plaintiff's loss was the result of general market conditions.
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by the two material errors for which D was not responsible. 128 It
seems unlikely that this burden of proof could be met because the
statutory measure of damages is not directly related to the character
or severity of any particular material error which contributed to
plaintiff's loss.' 29 BarChris provides an example. Among the material
errors in that case were: (1) a failure to disclose adequately a sub-
stantial increase in customer delinquencies; "0 and, (2) an overstate-
ment of gross profits for the quarter ending March 31, 1961, which
were shown as $483,121, rather than $252,366.13" It would seem to be
impossible for a defendant to prove that a specific amount of the loss
was in fact the result of one of these errors rather than the other. 32
3. Contribution
As a result of the difficulty of establishing the causation defense,
a person subject to liability under section 11 is likely to be held
jointly and severally liable for the full amount of plaintiff's dam-
ages, 33 unless he can prove that he did not fail to exercise due
diligence with respect to any part of the registration statement. The
statute provides an opportunity to obtain relief from this burden by
affording each defendant held liable a right to "recover contribution
as in cases of contract from any person who, if sued separately, would
have been liable to make the same payment.'13 4 This provision makes
every person, whom the plaintiff could have held jointly and severally
liable, subject to the contribution right of the other defendants.' 35 To
" The statutory reference to "such portion" of plaintiff's damages suggests that the
amount of that "portion" must be established with reasonable certainty. 1933 Act
§ ll(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964); see also JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 78.
' See notes 80-87 supra and accompanying text.
' BarChris, 283 F. Supp. 676-78, 681.
' Id. at 668, 681.
'This issue was not reached in the BarChris opinion because the case arose on motion
to dismiss. BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 703-04.
" If all purchasers of a security issue recovered damages under section 11, the maximum
amount of this liability would be the public offering price of the security. See note 84
supra and accompanying text.
"' 1933 Act § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1964).
' This conclusion follows from a literal reading of section 11(f), quoted in the text at
note 134 supra. One case has held that a defendant may recover contribution after the
statute of limitations of section 13 has expired, so long as the plaintiff was not barred
by section 13 when his action against the defendant was begun. Metzger v. Breeze
Corps., 37 F. Supp. 693, 695 (D.N.J. 1941). This holding suggests that, for section 11(f)
purposes, a defendant seeking to recover contribution steps into the plaintiff's shoes as
of the date the plaintiff brought suit.
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this rule there is an exception that one who becomes liable under
section 11 as the result of his fraudulent misrepresentation may not
recover contribution from another who was not also guilty of fraud.'36
The apparent purpose of this statutory arrangement is fairly
simple: the plaintiff is provided a relatively easy road to recovery,
and the defendants are then allowed to apportion the total joint and
several liability among themselves at their own expense. 137 Nation-
wide jurisdiction under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes
such an apportionment feasible. 38 However, neither BarChris nor any
other case contains a judicial discussion of how this allocation would
be made. 39
Nevertheless, it is possible for registration participants to anticipate
such an apportionment of section 11 liability. This can be done by
use of a contribution agreement, executed by the potential section 11
defendants at the outset of registration which would specify how sec-
tion 11 damages, if any, will be apportioned among the registration
participants. 140 To avoid running afoul of the policy against indem-
1933 Act § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1964).
'Section 11(f) of the 1933 Act affords a right to contribution to any person "who
becomes liable to make any payment under" section 11. 1933 Act § 11(f), 15 U.S.C.§ 77k(f) (1964). Section 11(e) provides that the costs of litigation may be taxed against
a party litigant who brings a suit, or raises a defense, which is "without merit." 1933 Act
§ 11(e), as amended, Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 207, 48 Stat. 907, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e)
(1964). A literal reading of this language might suggest that the right to contribution
applies to any "payment" required by reason of costs being taxed under section 11(e).
However, the legislative history and background of section 11 suggests that the right to
contribution provided for by section 11(f) does not encompass costs assessed under
section 11(e). Douglas & Bates, supra note 63, at 178-79 n.30. In addition, there is a
practical reason for not including, in a contribution agreement, a provision allocating costs
which may be taxed under section 11(e). The contribution agreement allocates the joint
and several liability imposed by section 11(f), so that the ultimate liability borne by
each registration participant will correspond to the consequences of his own conduct. It
would not be necessary to allocate costs assessed under section 11(e), because those
costs are taxed initially on an individual, rather than on a joint and several, basis, See
1933 Act § 11(e), as amended, Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 207, 48 Stat. 907, 15
U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964).
'Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to implead
any "person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of
the plaintiff's claim against him." F.R.C.P. Rule 14(a); Miller v. Hano, 8 F.RI). 67, 71
(E.D. Pa. 1947); see also 3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1739-40; 49 YALE L.J. 1423 (1940).
Thus, the need for multiple suits, which was a potential barrier to early enforcement
of the right to contribution, has been eliminated. See generally Douglas & Bates, supra
note 63, at 178-81.
" See 3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1739-40; 6 Loss 3855-56 (1969).
' See Douglas & Bates, supra note 63, at 178-81. The agreement would not apply to
participants who were found guilty of fraud. See note 136 supra and accompanying
text.
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nification of registration participants," 1 the apportionment must re-
main within the Securites Act policy of encouraging due diligence in
the preparation of registration statements."4 2 The remainder of this
comment will discuss how a contractual agreement can apportion sec-
tion 11 liability in a manner consistent with this important policy.
III. CONTRACTUAL ALLOCATION OF SECTION 11
LIABILITY
Conceptually, a contractual allocation of section 11 liability will
involve two steps. First, the total liability of the parties held jointly
and severally liable must be distributed in some way among the ma-
terial errors responsible for the plaintiff's loss. This will allocate a
specific portion of the total liability to each material error involved.
Second, the loss attributed to a particular material error must be
allocated among the parties responsible for the existence of that error.
The two steps in this analysis will be discussed separately because,
as will be apparent at the end of the discussion, each step is the basis
for a separate part of the allocation method.
A. Distribution of Loss Among Material Errors Responsible
1. Metkod of Distribution
(a) Equal Distribution. There are two alternative methods for
distributing the total liability among the material errors involved.
The first method would arbitrarily require an equal distribution of
the total liability. Thus, given a total liability of $100,000 and ten
material errors, $10,000 of the loss would be attributed to each ma-
...A principal function of civil liability under the Securities Act is to deter non-issuer
registration participants from allowing the registration statement to be prepared in a careless
manner. 3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1829-36. As Professor Loss points out, an agreement
which removes this deterrent is likely to be unenforceable. See also Globus v. Law Re-
search Service, Inc., 38 U.S.L.W. 2175 (2d Cir., Sept. 8, 1969), holding that an under-
writer who has actual knowledge of material misstatements in an offering circular, and
is therefore subject to liability under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, cannot enforce its
indemnification agreement against the issuer. The court reasoned that a contrary result
would encourage underwriters to be lax in their independent investigation of the accuracy
of the information presented in the offering circular.
'"See note 141 supra. The allocation method to be discussed in this comment should
not run afoul of this anti-indemnification policy because, as will be seen, a non-issuer
registration participant will remain subject to liability for the consequences of his
failure to exercise due diligence.
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terial error. This seems unsound as a matter of policy, because it
distributes loss equally among material errors which may be of un-
equal severity.1 43 Moreover, an equal distribution method would in-
crease the expense of a section 11 case. At the conclusion of plaintiff's
case, some, but not necessarily all, of the material errors in the regis-
tration statement will have been identified. 44 Because the liability of
each defendant under this method would depend on the number of
material errors found in the registration statement, it would be to the
advantage of at least some defendants to establish an exhaustive list
of all the material errors present. 45 As will be seen later, this dif-
ficulty can be avoided under a distribution method which allows
relatively minor material errors to have less significant consequences
than the others have.
(b) Proportional Distribution. The second distribution method
distributes the total liability among the material errors according to
the relative severity of those errors. This method is based on the as-
sumption of section 11 that the materiality requirement supplies an
implicit causal connection between a registration statement error and
a purchaser's damages resulting from that error.146 By definition, an
error that is material is one likely to affect the investment decision of
"average prudent investors", and thus to have an effect on the market
value of a purchaser's security. Therefore, it should be possible to
apportion a purchaser's loss in such a way that the more severe ma-
terial errors carry the burden of a larger portion of the total loss.
147
M aterial errors can be of unequal severity because materiality is merely a threshold
measure. See note 147 infra. In addition, see generally notes 91-101 supra and accompany-
ing text.
An equal distribution method would also be undesirable for the registration participants.
Such a method would require the participants to commit themselves to a relatively fixed
liability before they knew how the particular registration would develop.
"A plaintiff need not identify all the material errors in the registration statement. A
defendant is subject to joint and several liability if he can be implicated in any one ma-
terial error. See 1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964). Thus, a plaintiff may
possibly establish only enough material errors to obtain a collectible judgment.
"An equal distribution method would encourage each defendant to establish the
existence of material errors for which he was not responsible, regardless of the severity
of those errors. For a discussion of how material errors may be of unequal severity, see
notes 146-47 infra and accompanying text.
"The existence of a causal relationship between materiality and the plaintiff's
damages is the underlying assumption of the disclosure philosophy as implemented in
the Securities Act. See notes 33-34, 61-62, 67-68, 100-01 supra and accompanying text.
" Materiality is merely a threshold measure that determines whether a particular
error would, if the truth were known, "have deterred or tended to deter the average
prudent investor from purchasing the securities in question." See text at note 92 supra.
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In addition to promoting an equitable distribution of loss among the
preparers of a registration statement, a proportional method of dis-
tributing the loss will have the advantage of encouraging the preparers
of a registration statement to pay particular attention to items likely
to have the most significant effects on the security's market value. 4 '
The mechanics of a proportional method of distribution are rel-
atively simple. Essentially, the market effects of each material error,
whether raised by the plaintiff or by one of the defendants,'49 would
be estimated by a mutually agreed number of investment analysts. 5 '
This could be done in the following manner. Initially, the analysts
would be asked to value the security issue1  on the basis of the in-
formation contained in the registration statement as though its
accuracy were not questioned. Then, in response to a series of hypo-
Of course, the decision of an "average prudent investor" to purchase or not to purchase
a security will depend on the security's current market price. A relatively severe material
error can be expected to deflate the average prudent investor's estimate of the value of
the security more than would a relatively trivial material error. Thus, a particular
material error will reduce the average prudent investor's demand for the security,
which will in turn reduce the market price of the security until demand, at a lower
price, is re-established. The price at which demand for the security is re-established can
be expected to depend on the severity of the material error involved. Thus, it should be
possible to correlate each material error with its expected market effects, assuming
there is sufficient knowledge of the "average prudent investor's" expectable purchasing
habits.
"' Under the proposal being discussed, the relative severity of each material error will
be determined by a group of investment analysts. The ultimate liability of a particular
defendant will depend upon the relative severity of the material error with respect to
which his liability is asserted. See notes 175-76 infra and accompanying text.
It might be argued that this arrangement will have the effect of encouraging the par-
ticipants to be careless with respect to errors which, although material, are relatively
minor in terms of their expected market effect. Such a result, however, is unlikely. The
threat of a delaying stop-order, which may destroy the success of an offering as well as
impair the reputation of the participant within the financial community, should be a
sufficient deterrent to careless preparation of a registration statement. See WHrT &
BLACKSTO 'sE, supra note 10, at 558. It should be noted that in stop order proceedings,
the SEC has repeatedly held that the registration statement as a whole must provide
adequate disclosure. See, e.g., Associated Gas and Electric Co., 11 SEC 975, 1059 (1942);
National Educators Mutual Association, Inc., 1 SEC 208 (1935).
"'The procedural alternatives for establishing the existence of, and responsibility for,
material errors after the close of the plaintiff's case are discussed at notes 168-72 infra
and accompanying text.
' The number of analysts whose opinions would be considered, and the method of
selecting the analysts, could be specified in the contribution agreement. In the absence
of a contribution agreement, the parties might agree to a pre-trial stipulation on these
matters. See generally notes 168-74 infra and accompanying text.
" A recent analysis of the SEC's valuation decisions is contained in C. BoSLAND,
VALUATION THEORIES AND DECISIONS OF THE SEC (1964). The author's conclusions sug-
gest that valuations of the kind being discussed would be made on the basis of informed
judgment, rather than by application of any specific formula. That should not present
difficulties, however, because use of the same analysts throughout a particular case will
produce a set of relative valuations based on consistent assumptions.
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thetical questions, the same analysts would give successive valuations
for the issue; each valuation would be based on the registration
statement with one of the material errors corrected. 152 Using a series
of questions to obtain separate valuations is desirable in order to
avoid the possibility of inducing a sequential bias. 3 The questioning
would continue until a specific valuation is associated with each of
the material errors involved. From the series of valuations thus ob-
tained, a ratio would be derived for distributing the total liability
among the material errors.
An example will illustrate this proportional distribution method.
Consider an entity that floats a $500,000 debenture issue. Later,
purchasers of the debentures recover damages under section 11 be-
cause the registration statement contained three material errors: 154
(1) current assets, presented in the registration statement at
$5,000,000, were overstated by $750,000; (2) contigent liabilities,
presented at $275,000, were understated by $150,000; and, (3) the
registration statement failed to disclose that a critical mineral lease,
with no option to renew, was about to expire. After the defendant's
liability is established, the investment analysts would be asked to
value the issue on the basis of the information contained in the
registration statement. Then, to determine the effect of each material
error on the market value of the debenture issue, the analysts would
be asked a series of three hypothetical questions. Each question would
require the analysts to value the issue on the basis of the information
"Use of the same analysts should produce valuations that are based on consistent
assumptions.
' Cumulative valuations would be likely to exaggerate the relative severity of the
first material errors to be evaluated. Successive material errors would thus tend to be
undervalued. Compare the observation of the court in BarChris with respect to an error
held not material, supra note 98 and accompanying text. Thus, the valuations given ma-
terial errors under a cumulative valuation method would depend upon which material
error was considered first. This problem is avoided by separate valuations, which produce
independent, rather than incremental, estimates of the market effects of the material
errors involved. See, e.g., the examples at notes 154-59 infra and accompanying text. Such
a result is consistent with the assumptions of the materiality test, 'which focuses on the
production of an accurate registration statement rather than on the 'combination of
material errors which did in fact influence the investment decision of a particular plaintiff.
See notes 33-34, 100-01 supra and accompanying text.
'These three examples are, strictly speaking, the results of material errors rather
than the material errors themselves. Thus, they are in the nature of findings of fact rather
than the specific items on which those findings are based. See notes 94-99 supra and
accompanying text, illustrating how the BarChris court discussed the material errors in
a similar manner.
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contained in the registration statement, with one of the material er-
rors corrected. When a separate valuation is attributed to each ma-
terial error, the proportional effect of each material error would be
calculated. The method of calculation is illustrated by the following
table:
Decrease
Est. value in value
with one attributed
Error error to that Decimal
number corrected' 5 5  error1 5 6  equivalent1 5 7
No errors $500,000158 -
Error 1 490,000 $10,000 .20
Error 2 485,000 15,000 .30
Error 3 475,000 25,000 .50
The decimal equivalents, if applied to the total liability, will yield
the amount of the total loss attributable to each material error. Thus,
if the plaintiff paid $50,000 for his debentures, which he sold at the
time of suit for $20,000, his total recovery would be $30,000; 1"9 the
liability attributed to material errors 1, 2, and 3, respectively, would
be $6,000, $9,000, and $15,000.
(c) Advantages of a Proportional Distribution. Efficiency is a
principal benefit of a proportional, rather than equal, distribution of
the total liability. First, all the material errors in the registration
statement need not be identified. Because the total liability is dis-
'The figures in this column represent the analysts' responses to the hypothetical
questions mentioned in the text. Each figure shown would be a consensus of the analysts
or, if the valuations were made in judicial proceedings, a separate finding of fact. See notes
168-72 infra and accompanying text for discussion of the alternative procedures available
for obtaining these valuations.
' The figures in this column are "dummy" figures, used only for the purpose of
calculating the relative effects of the material errors as shown in the "Decimal equivalent"
column. Thus, it is immaterial that the figures shown in the "Decrease in value" column
do not add up to the plaintiff's total loss.
'The decimal equivalents are calculated by dividing the figures in the "Decrease in
value" column by their largest common denominator. In the example in the text, this
denominator is $5000; the division produces results of 2, 3, and 5, attributed to
errors 1, 2, and 3, respectively. These results are then added to produce a total (10,
here) ; this total is then used as the base for a series of fractions (2/10, 3/10, and 5/10,
in this example), which are converted to their decimal equivalents.
" Because the securities may have been issued at a discount, this figure, which repre-
sents the estimated value of the securities on the basis of the information presented in
the registration statement, is not necessarily identical to the face value of the securities.
Identity or lack of identity is immaterial, however, because all valuations, including
the initial one, will be based on the same assumptions. See note 152 supra and accom-
panying text.
's See notes 80-84 supra and accompanying text.
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tributed among the material errors on the basis of their respective
market effects, only the material errors likely to have had a significant
effect on the market value of the issue need be considered."6 In a
section 11 case, it is possible that nearly all of the significant ma-
terial errors would have been identified by the plaintiff in the main
action. 6' A judicial determination of the materiality of, and respon-
sibility for, these errors could be made binding on the defendants.' 62
Any defendant who desired to establish the existence of, and respon-
sibility for, other material errors, after the plaintiff had recovered his
joint and several judgment and was out of the case, could do so at
his expense.6 3 However, relatively trivial material errors would not
shift enough of the proportionate loss away from a particular defen-
dant e 4 to justify the expense necessary to establish their existence.16 5
Presumably, each defendant could assert any material error which
plaintiff could have used as a basis for relief. 66
An additional advantage of a proportional distribution is that it
would be unnecessary to consider each material error individually.
10 See note 147 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of how the various ma-
terial errors may have different effects on the security's market value.
B'See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
'The defendants could agree to be bound in their contribution agreement, or, in the
absence of such an agreement, they could be bound if joined in the action under Rule
14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See note 138 supra.
The Supreme Court has held that a contractual provision requiring arbitration between
the parties to a controversy under section 12(2) of the Securities Act was void. Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The Court based its decision on section 14 of the Act, 1933
Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1964), which invalidates any contractual stipulation waiving
compliance with any provision of the Securities Act. Because section 14 is designed to
protect a plaintiff's right of action under the Security Act, the rule of Wilko v. Swan
should have no application to a contribution agreement between the defendants in a
section 11 case.
'Although this could be done in a continuation of the original judicial proceedings, it
would not be done at plaintiff's expense. Thus, this method of enforcing the section 11
right to contribution would avoid the argument that a wrongdoer should not be allowed
to obtain a benefit at the expense of the injured party.
I The liability of a participant with respect to a particular material error cannot
exceed the proportion of the total loss attributed to that error. See text at notes 175-76
infra.
'Under a proportional distribution method, each defendant could decide for himself
whether he would gain sufficient advantage from establishing an additional material error
to justify the expense involved. In contrast, an equal distribution method would encour-
age the production of an exhaustive list of material errors in the registration statement.
See note 145 supra and accompanying text.
'The statutory language allowing a defendant to recover contribution "from any
person who, if sued separately, would have been liable . . .", 1933 Act § 11(e), 15
U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964), would seem to support a conclusion that a participant asserting
the existence of other material errors would step into plaintiff's shoes.
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Instead, material errors could be grouped together for consideration
so long as the same parties defendant are responsible for all the ma-
terial errors included within a particular group. Thus, if three mate-
rial errors are present in the certified balance sheet, the auditor and
the issuer would be the only parties responsible for each of these
errors if no other party knew or had reason to know of the errors;
therefore, the market effect of all three errors, considered as a unit,
could be estimated. 67 But if, for example, an underwriter knew of
one of these material errors, he also would be responsible for the conse-
quences; as a result, the errors would have to be removed from the
group so that their market effect could be estimated separately.
2. Alternative Methods of Securing the Opinions of Investment
Analysts
A proportional distribution method requires the use of investment
analysts' opinions. There are two ways in which these opinions could
be obtained. It would be best for the parties to provide for a mutually
acceptable method in a contribution agreement, entered at the outset
of the registration process. 68 This agreement could specify how the
parties would select a panel of analysts and secure their opinions in
an out-of-court proceeding after the plaintiff had recovered his judg-
ment in the main section 11 action. The panel would also be empow-
ered to identify additional material errors and to affix responsibility
for them. 6 9
However, it is also possible for the non-issuer defendants to imple-
ment a proportional distribution method in judicial proceedings. The
investment analysts could testify as experts in the judicial proceed-
ings, 7 ' after the plaintiff had obtained his joint and several judg-
17 The court in BarChris grouped together material errors in this manner. See notes 94-
99 supra and accompanying text. Grouping of errors also avoids technical arguments con-
cerning the precise definition of a material error, because attention is focused on the
results of the errors rather than on the specific errors themselves.
' Entering the contribution agreement at the outset of registration would facilitate
planning by the parties to the agreement. See text at Part IV infra.
1" Because the panel would take no action until after the plaintiff had recovered his
joint and several judgment, the deliberations of the panel would have no effect on the
plaintiff. Therefore, the contribution agreement would not amount to a mandatory arbi-
tration agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, which would be invalid. See
note 162 supra.
'See, e.g., C. McCoRmicK, LAw OF EviDENCE, 28-29 (1954). The investment analysts
would need sufficient skill, knowledge, and experience to qualify as expert witnesses.
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ment.171 In that event, the trier of fact172 would consider the separate
testimony of each analyst in determining the estimated decline in
market value attributable to each material error. A separate finding
of fact would be made with respect to each material error. A propor-
tional distribution method can be used in this way even if no contribu-
tion agreement is entered, because of the policies of section 11 and
of the Securities Act, discussed above. However, that conclusion
is necessarily -uncertain because it assumes a court would not hold
that a literal reading of section 11(f) requires use of an equal dis-
tribution method unless the parties provide for a different method
by agreement. 74
B. Allocation Among the Parties Defendant
The preceding section has discussed how the joint and several
liability of the parties defendant can be distributed among the mate-
rial errors responsible for the plaintiff's loss. The purpose of that
distribution is to make it possible to associate a defendant's ultimate
liability with the damage resulting from his own carelessness. After
this initial distribution is made among the material errors, it is neces-
sary to allocate the liability attributable to each material error, or
group of material errors, 75 among the defendants responsible. Because
this allocation is intended to correlate a defendant's ultimate liability
as much as possible with his responsibility for the production of an
inaccurate registration statement,1 76 it is important to correlate this
allocation with the standard of care required by section 11.
'
7 This sequence would avoid burdening the plaintiff with the expense involved in
allocating liability for the total amount of the plaintiff's judgment among the registration
participants. See generally note 137 supra.1
-
2 It may be desirable to use a master for this purpose. See, e.g., F.R.C.P. Rule 53.
'n See notes 133-39 and 141 supra and accompanying text. In addition, the Securities
Act affords registration participants the causation defense, discussed at notes 76-79, 122-
32 supra and accompanying text. Although the causation defense is impractical to use,
see notes 78, 122-32 supra and accompanying text, its presence indicates Congressional
approval of an allocation of the total joint and several liability among the registration
participants involved.
""Section 11(f) allows contribution "as in cases of contract' 1933 Act § 11(f), 15
U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1964). Contribution among those having a common contractual obliga-
tion, as distinguished from contribution among joint tortfeasors, would distribute loss
equally among the common obligors. See 2 S. WMLLISTON, CoNTaAcTs, § 345 (3rd ed.
1959). Even in cases of tort, equal sharing, rather than an allocation based on com-
parative fault, would appear to be the majority rule. See W. PRossER, TORTS 278 (3rd ed.
1964).
121 See note 167 supra and accompanying text.
"The importance of obtaining this correlation if a contribution agreement is used is
discussed at notes 141-42 supra and accompanying text.
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1. A Functional Analysis of the Parties' Responsibility for Preparing
an Accurate Registration Statement
The standard of care which section 11 imposes on registration par-
ticipants is designed to produce accurate information in the registra-
tion statement for the benefit of investors. 77 This information is
produced as the result of the performance of two basic functions by
the parties involved. The first function, that of producing the infor-
mation on which the registration statement will be based, is performed
by the issuer.178 An issuer failing to perform this function accurately
is subject to liability for the consequences of any resultant errors
regardless of its exercise of due care.1 9 The second function involves
verifying the information produced by the issuer."" Responsibility
for the satisfactory performance of this function is divided among
several expert and non-expert participants, each of whom is held to
a standard of due diligence.' 8 '
The sequence in which these two functions are performed suggests
their relationship. Preparation of a registration statement begins with
the issuer, which produces the accounts and records on which the
information to be presented in the registration statement is based.
Subsequently, the accuracy of these accounts and records is verified
by non-issuer participants, whose function is thus superimposed on
the issuer's function of producing the information to be verified.'82 A
' See notes 3-5 supra and accompanying text.
78 The role of an issuer in furnishing the information on which the registration state-
ment is based was pointed out in the House Report on the original Securities Act as a
reason for requiring registration of certain secondary distributions of securities:
Wherever such a redistribution reaches significant proportions, the distributor would
be in the position of controlling the issuer and thus able to furnish the information
demanded by the bill. This being so, the distributor is treated as equivalent to the
original issuer ....
H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1933) (emphasis added). See also Ready,
The Auditor's Protection Against Liability Based on Clients' Fraud, 16 Bus. LAW. 1039
(1961), discussing how the accuracy of a certified financial statement is limited by the
accuracy of the information furnished to the auditor by management.
'1O See notes 102-03 supra and accompanying text.
'See, e.g., Homer E. Kerlin, A.S.R. No. 105, CCH FaD. SEc. L. RaP. 11 76,127, at
62,296 (June 29, 1966):
A public accountant's examination is intended to be an independent check upon
management's accounting of its stewardship. Thus he has a direct and unavoidable
responsibility of his own . . .
See also Cornucopia Gold Mines, 1 SEC 364 (1936). In addition, see generally 21
STAir. L. REv. 171, 176-87 (1968), summarizing the BarChris decision with respect to the
directors, comptroller, independent accountants, and underwriters.
2' See notes 102-11 supra and accompanying text.
'See, e.g., Ready, supra note 178.
124
A Proposal for Allocating Liability
material error in the registration statement can result only if both
functions are improperly performed. The importance of encouraging
the verifiers to perform their function properly"s' suggests that non-
issuer participants failing to exercise due diligence with respect to a
particular material error should be primarily liable for the conse-
quences of that error.1 8s
It is not unduly severe to hold primarily liable the non-issuer par-
ticipants who fail to satisfy their responsibility for verifying the in-
formation to be presented in the registration statement. The non-issuer
participants have an opportunity to avoid liability by exercising due
diligence. Moreover, these participants have different responsibilities
for investigating the accuracy of the information produced by the
issuer. " In addition, the policy of the Securities Act would be frus-
trated by some different allocation that allowed the verifiers to pass
the consequences of their carelessness onto the issuer.8 6 Thus, non-
issuer participants who fail to exercise due diligence with respect to
a material error should be held primarily liable, as a group, for the
loss attributable to that error. On the other hand, if all the non-issuer
participants did exercise due diligence with respect to the material
error, then the issuer should bear the loss.
'See the discussion of the policy against agreements that would remove civil liability
as a sanction to careless performance of the verification function, at notes 141-42 supra
and accompanying text.
'See, e.g., Homer E. Kerlin, supra note 180.
'H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933).
'The proportional distribution method suggested would generally limit the liability of
each non-issuer participant to the consequences of his own failure to exercise due dili-
gence. At the same time, however, the method would retain civil liability as a deterrent
to careless preparation of the registration statement.
A different method of distributing the total liability that would make the issuer, rather
than the careless non-issuer participant, primarily liable for a material error in the
registration statement would probably violate the Securities Act policy against indemnity
agreements. See notes 141-42 supra and accompanying text. See also.McDowell, Directors
Liabilities in Securities Transactions, 22 Bus. LAW. 76, 78 (1966). However, a non-
issuer registration participant could seek to obtain indemnification from the issuer without
sacrificing the advantages of the contribution agreement that has been discussed. The
non-issuer could reduce his exposure to liability by entering the contribution agreement.
He could also enter a collateral reimbursement agreement with the issuer in which the
issuer would hold the non-issuer harmless from liability under section 11. See the dis-
cussion at notes 197-99 infra and accompanying text. Even if the collateral agreement
were held invalid or otherwise unenforceable, the non-issuer could still enjoy the limited
liability afforded by the contribution agreement. This situation would be an improvement
over the present state of affairs, because an underwriter, for example, may now be sub-ject to liability for the full amount of a purchaser's recovery under section 11 if the under-
writer's underwriting agreement with the issuer is held unenforceable. See notes 122-23
supra and accompanying text.
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If the liability attributable to a particular material error is allocated
to a group of non-issuer participants, it is necessary to further allocate
the liability among the members of the group. An equal allocation is
the simplest means of making this division."8 ' Thus, for example, if
the certifying accountant and a director failed to exercise due dil-
igence with respect to a particular material error, to which $10,000
of plaintiff's loss is attributed, the accountant and the director would
each be liable as a result of that error to the extent of $5,000. Such
a division among members of the group seems justified by the fact
that each member of the group made an equal contribution to the
existence of the error in the sense that each member failed to exercise
due diligence. 88
2. Liability of Controlling Persons
Section 15189 of the Securities Act makes any person who "controls"
any person liable under section 11 jointly and severally liable "to the
same extent" as the person controlled. To accomplish the statutory
purpose, the existence of control will be found whenever control is
present in fact.' A person in control will escape liability only if he
"had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence
of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person
is alleged to exist.""'- Under the proportional allocation method being
discussed, it would seem that the liability allocated to a controlling
person should be equally divided between the controlling person and
the person controlled, with each bearing one-half of the allocated
liability.' 2 This equal division recognizes the fact that the existence
of control does not alter the responsibility the other registration
participants have for producing an accurate registration statement.
'sT See Douglas & Bates, supra note 63, at 178 n.30, 178-79.
's The non-issuer registration participants have an equal responsibility for producing
an accurate registration statement in the sense that each non-issuer has a duty to exercise
due diligence. Of course the contents of that duty are different for the various non-
issuer participants. See note 185 supra and accompanying text.
... 1933 Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1964).
"'E.g., Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1957).
" 1933 Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1964).
'2 This assumes that a controlling person held liable by section 15 can take advantage
of the right to contribution afforded by section 11. Such a conclusion is consistent with
the language of section 15 which makes the controlling person jointly and severally
liable "with and to the same extent" as the person controlled. Id. There seems to be no
policy that would be furthered by a contrary conclusion. See generally Douglas & Bates,
supra note 63, at 179, pointing out the ambiguity of the statutory language.
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3. Insolvency
Absent a workable contribution provision in section 11, the defen-
dants would remain jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's
damages. In that event, the risk of one of the defendants being in-
solvent would be borne by the other defendants. Thus, the ultimate
liability of a solvent defendant would be increased by the insolvency
of one of the other defendants. 193 Implementing the defendants' right
to contribution should produce the same result. The liability allocated
to an insolvent defendant could be borne by the solvent defendants
held liable in proportion to the amounts of their respective liabilities.
Or, instead, any insolvent non-issuer participant could be removed
from the suit, which would then be conducted as though the insolvent's
due diligence with respect to the registration statement were not in
issue. 9 4
4. Collateral Agreements
The preceding discussion has suggested the use of a contribution
agreement to allocate the burden of a section 11 judgment among the
registration participants held jointly and severally liable. Such an
agreement would be entered at the outset of registration, so that the
parties potentially liable under section 11 could rely on the agree-
ment's allocation method while preparing the registration statement.
In addition to reducing the uncertainty inherent in attempts to predict
the outcome of a judicial, rather than contractual, application of the
right to contribution,'95 such an agreement could avoid much of the
expense of a judicial proceeding. A contribution agreement drafted
in accordance with the principles that have been discussed is reason-
ably certain to be enforceable because it would retain civil liability
as a deterrent to careless preparation of the registration statement. 96
It will be recalled that a non-issuer participant will be liable under
the contribution agreement only if a material error is found, and that
=See Douglas & Bates, supra note 63, at 178 n.30.
"In BarChris, for example, the case was severed with respect to one of the under-
writers, Ira Haupt & Co., which was in bankruptcy at the time of suit. BarChrls, 283 F.
Supp. at 652 n.1. See also 2 S. WLISTON, CoNTRACTS 777 n.13 (3rd ed. 1959), pointing
out that insolvent debtors were excluded from the pro-rata calculation under equitable
contribution principles.
'0 See notes 139, 173-74 supra and accompanying text.
'See 3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1829-36; see generally, 49 YAr.E LJ. 1423 (1940).
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nearly all material errors are, in part, the result of the issuer's faulty
accounts and records.' 9 7 Some non-issuer participants may object to
being held liable for the consequences of an error that was, at least
in part, the result of inaccurate information supplied by the issuer.
Consequently, a non-issuer participant, in addition to entering a con-
tribution agreement, may desire to enter a separate collateral agree-
ment with the issuer, under which the issuer would agree to reimburse
the non-issuer for all or part of the liability the latter may incur under
section 11. This collateral agreement, separate from the contribution
agreement, could be similar in scope to the underwriting agreements
currently entered between the issuer and an underwriter.-9 The
provisions of each collateral agreement would be the product of sep-
arate negotiations between the issuer and each non-issuer participant.
Nothing in the contribution agreement that has been discussed would
prevent the use of such collateral agreements. A collateral agreement
would be ineffective only if the issuer became insolvent, or if the
agreement was held to be an unenforceable indemnity agreement.'9 9
However, the invalidity of a collateral agreement would not affect
the validity, or the advantages, of the (separate) contribution agree-
ment.
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion has developed a method of allocating
liability among registration participants held jointly and severally
liable under section 11, and has suggested the use of a contribution
agreement to implement this allocation. The analytic framework
furnished by the agreement would enable a prospective registration
participant to estimate his exposure to liability on the basis of his own
evaluations of the expected market effects of particular material er-
rors and his confidence that he will satisfy the due diligence standard.
Moreover, a non-issuer participant could be fairly certain that his
ultimate liability would be limited to the consequences of his own
carelessness. Thus, he could make a more rational decision about
'See notes 177-84 supra and accompanying text.
I's3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1834-35.
' See notes 141-42 supra and accompanying text.
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whether to become involved in the preparation of a particular regis-
tration statement. And a non-issuer participant who decides to under-
take the task could estimate his areas of maximum risk and allocate
his efforts accordingly, reducing unnecessary expense. Finally, he
could consider his estimated liability in setting his fee, in obtaining
insurance, °0 and in drafting the terms of any collateral reimbursement
agreement he may desire to enter with the issuer.
John R. Allison*
The contribution agreement that has been discussed would facilitate insurance
against the risk of liability under section 11. The availability, and feasibility, of insurance
depends in part upon the accuracy with which a potential risk can be estimated. See
generally Comment, supra note 13, at 181 n.228. A contribution agreement incorporating
a proportional distribution method would provide a framework for estimating a non-
issuer's maximum areas of exposure to section 11 liability. See also Wheat & Blackstone,
supra note 10, at 552.
* Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n. B.S., Stanford University, 1966; J.D., Univer-
sity of Washington, 1969.
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